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ford, N.J., 1969). His book has to be added to the list of recent "essential 
reading" that includes Norton's book, already mentioned, a work of greater 
and at times lesser significance than its topic, the exiles in England, might 
suggest; L.F.S. Upton's William Smith (Toronto, 1969) — there's room for 
lots more biographies; Scot Symons, Heritage: A Romantic Look at Early 
Canadian Furniture (Toronto, 1971), an indication of the possibilities of an 
unorthodox approach; Charles R. McKirdy, "A Bar Divided: The Lawyers 
of the American Revolution", The American Journal of Legal History, 17 
(1972), pp. 205-214 and Anne A. Allan, "Patriots and Loyalists: The Choice 
of Political Allegiance by members of Maryland's Elite", Journal of Southern 
History, 38 (1972), pp. 283-292, both of which have the over-riding virtue of 
a broad approach. The future of Loyalist studies looks bright and compli-
cated and exciting. 
WALLACE BROWN 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN PRAIRIE HISTORIOGRAPHY 
Plains historiography is at least a century old. A recent article by T.D. 
Regehr surveys over one hundred key books, articles and papers published 
since 1870 which have shaped our conception of the historical development 
of the Canadian prairie west.1 Nevertheless, even with this long and honor-
able tradition, the study of plains history has not often been marked by sig-
nificant academic dissent, reinterpretation or even widespread controversy. 
The historiography of the prairies has been keyed to harmony, tradition 
and academic conservatism, and though many recent works have expanded 
the scope and depth of prairie history,2 few have offered challenge to ideas 
and beliefs which have prevailed for at least a generation. As the popular 
song once reminded us, however, "the times, they are changing." In the last 
half decade or so a number of books and articles have appeared which are 
important not so much for the new ground they cover as for the old terrain 
they attempt to re-map. Though it would be an obvious over-dramatization 
(not to mention exaggeration) to assert that a whole new era is upon us, it 
does appear that a handful of scholars are finally beginning to offer some 
significant, even radical, reinterpretation of the history of the Canadian 
prairies. Some of these works will, perhaps, finally spark the beginning of 
1 T.D. Regehr, "Historiography of the Canadian Plains after 1870," in R. Allen, (ed.), A. Region 
of the Mind (Regina, Canadian Plains Studies Centre, 1973). 
2 See, for example, R. Allen, The Social Passion: Religion and Social Reform in Canada, 1914-
1928 (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1971); P. Berton, The National Dream (Toronto, 
McLelland and Stewart, 1970) and The Last Spike (Toronto, McLelland and Stewart, 1971); 
J. Gray, The Winter Years (Toronto, Macmillan, 1966), The Boy From Winnipeg (Toronto: 
Macmillan, 1969) and Red Lights on the Prairies (Toronto, Macmillan, 1971). 
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healthy scholarly controversy while others may be ignored. They cannot 
fail, in any case, to lend a new maturity to our understanding of the dynamics 
which have shaped the history of the prairie west. 
One of the most perplexing problems concerning the political development 
of the prairies has centred on the growth of two apparently very different 
protest movements in two provinces which appear to be very much alike; 
Social Credit in Alberta and the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation 
(CCF) in Saskatchewan. C.B. Macpherson's study of Social Credit in Alberta,3 
still considered a pivotal work by many political scientists and historians, 
posited the existence of a 'quasi party' system in Alberta but left the question of 
why such a system did not also develop in Saskatchewan almost completely un-
answered. In 1969 David E. Smith attempted to provide the missing link in a 
comparative study of political developments in the two provinces. Smith con-
cluded that in both cases the fortunes of the provincial Liberal parties, com-
bined with the influence of Henry Wise Wood in Alberta, accounted for the 
differences. Smith accepted Macpherson's analysis of the Alberta political 
scene and worked from the assumption that the rise of Social Credit and the 
existence of a 'quasi party' system went together. Conversely, the survival of a 
"real" party system in Saskatchewan during the 1920's preserved conditions 
which allowed for the rise of the CCF. This occurred because Premier Martin 
successfully divorced his provincial Liberal party from national politics in 
general and from the federal Liberals in particular. The arrangement fostered 
an even stronger alliance between provincial Liberals and the Saskatchewan 
Grain Growers Association; by contrast such an alignment never developed in 
Alberta, where the UFA adhering to the group government theories of Henry 
Wise Wood, were determined to stay clear of politics up to 1919. Once forced 
by groups such as the Non Partisan League to involve themselves in political 
activity the UFA was able to do so alone and did not act in conjunction with 
the provincial Liberals. The short and long term result of this process was 
that the Alberta party system was destroyed by the UFA's dramatic capture of 
the government in 1920 while the party system in Saskatchewan remained in-
tact, allowed the CCF to grow and develop in opposition from 1933, and gave 
them the opportunity of seizing power from a weak Liberal administration in 
1944. Because there was no party system as such in Alberta in 1935. Social Credit 
could follow in the tradition of the UFA by taking all the marbles at one and the 
first time, and then settle in to govern under the same 'quasi party' conditions 
which had protected the UFA.4 
Smith's theory is intriguing and makes Macpherson's earlier interpretations 
whole. But the basic assumption of his and Macpherson's arguments are being 
3 C.B. Macpherson, Democracy in Alberta (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1953). 
4 David E. Smith, "A Comparison of Prairie Political Developments in Saskatchewan and 
Alberta," Journal of Canadian Studies, IV (February, 1969). 
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increasingly called into question by writers who doubt whether there ever 
was any real difference, actual or perceived, between the CCF and Social 
Credit. John W. Bennett and Cynthia Krueger, were amongst the first to 
conclude that the CCF was never really socialist and that it began ". . .com-
promising its radical doctrine the day after the day after the Regina Manifesto 
was issued . . . . " Supporters of the CCF in Saskatchewan voted for the party 
because it was the farmers' own creation, or because it represented a "better 
break" for the farmers and made it possible for them to "compete with the 
city people" but not because they were committed to socialism. Bennett 
and Kruger did believe, however, that the CCF retained some vestiges of its 
socialist heritage until just prior to its 1944 provincial election victory.5 
Not so Peter Sinclair. In a recently published analysis of the pre-1944 
Saskatchewan CCF, Sinclair described the birth, growth and ascent to power 
of a true political party always ready to sacrifice ideological principle in its 
search for power. Sinclair hinged his argument on CCF land policy and con-
cluded that significant modifications were being made in this area even prior 
to the 1934 provincial election so that both party and policy would be more 
attractive to the voters. Even so, the party suffered a resounding defeat in 
its first election and this, Sinclair maintained, ". . . marked the end of the 
socialist phase for the CCF in Saskatchewan." By 1937 the CCF had so watered 
down its socialism, in part to enable it to forge an alliance with Social Credit 
against the Liberals that " . . . its position in Saskatchewan had become similar to 
what the Social Credit government was actually doing in Alberta." Sinclair 
saw no great mystery in Social Credit's failure in Saskatchewan. To begin 
with it was an imported product with no local roots and had an authoritarian 
flavour which did not go down well with the voters. Then, too, Aberhart, by 
the time of the 1938 provincial election, had certainly wrought no miracles 
in the neighbouring province of Alberta. In other words, Sinclair did not be-
lieve that any fundamental ideological objection to Social Credit existed, only 
that its failure grew from normal political considerations and conditions. As 
for the CCF, once its socialist ideas were shed, it became a reformist party 
not unlike Social Credit during its first years. Sinclair firmly believed that 
"CCF members accepted small scale capitalist production and only flirted 
briefly with a socialist solution to the agrarian crisis of the thirties."6 
Two new essays by Gary Teeple and R.T. Naylor attack the same problem 
but from a distinctly marxist viewpoint. Teeple asserted that the CCF never 
amounted to anything more than a party of moralistic liberalism which sought 
to reform capitalism — in part through government ownership — but not to 
5 John W. Bennett and Cynthia Krueger, "Agrarian Pragmatism and Radical Politics" in S.M. 
Lipset, Agrarian Socialism, Up-dated edition, (New York, Anchor Books, 1968). 
6 Peter Sinclair, "The Saskatchewan CCF: Ascent to Power and the Decline of Socialism," 
Canadian Historical Review, LIV (December, 1973). 
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change it. They were, in short, Liberals in a hurry. His yardstick consists of 
the three most essential aspects of marxist ideology; the labour theory of 
value, historical materialism and the class struggle. Since the CCF rejected all 
three from the start and adopted a course of Fabian "parliamentarism," he as-
serted, they cannot be considered socialist at all.7 If Teeple's analysis is ac-
cepted, Naylor's argument naturally follows from it. He explained the Social 
Credit/CCF phenomenon by asserting that there was no significant difference 
between the two. Both accepted capitalism, both sought to reform the system 
and bring about a more equitable distribution of wealth, both accepted the 
private ownership of property — specifically the family farm — as funda-
mental to prairie society. Furthermore, the CCF and Social Credit were both 
manifestations of western discontent and both aimed to smash eastern bank-
ing and mercantile power while turning the terms of national trade in favour 
of the west.8 
The "French Fact" in western settlement has been one of the few areas 
of controversy in prairie historiography since the days of Louis Riel. In the 
last five years new approaches have been brought to bear against interpre-
tations which have become too firmly rooted in Canadian historical literature. 
Donald Creighton has been a leader amongst those who have asserted that the 
west was intended to be a preserve for English Canadians but that Ottawa's 
plans were foiled by Louis Riel and Bishop Tache who used the provisional 
government established at Red River in 1869 to blackmail guarantees of separ-
ate schools and French language rights out of John A. Macdonald. He has 
gone so far as to assert that this was done against the wishes of the inhabi-
tants of the area.9 These views have recently been challenged by Ralph 
Heintzman. Heintzman has accused Creighton of being much too careful in 
the selection of his sources and of studiously ignoring strong evidence that 
many political leaders intended the west to be bicultural. This came not out 
of any philosophic commitment to French-English partnership but simply 
because Canadian politicians were very practical men and had learned, dur-
ing the union period of 1840 to 1867 how to accommodate themselves to the 
hard facts of Canadian duality. They were, as a result, willing to grant bicul-
tural status to Manitoba (1870) and the Northwest Territories (1875 and 
1877) because it appeared that the white and metis inhabitants wished it. To 
support this argument Heintzman pointed out that the Ruperts Land Act of 
7 Gary Teeple, "Liberals in a Hurry: "Socialism and the CCF-NDP," in G. Teeple (ed), Cap-
italism and the National Question in Canada (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1972). 
8 R.T. Naylor, "The Ideological Foundations of Social Democracy and Social Credit," in ibid. 
9 There are several examples of Creighton's views. See, for example, Donald Creighton, "John 
A. Macdonald, Confederation and the Canadian West," Historical and Scientific Society of 
Manitoba, Transactions, Series III, No. 23, 1966-67 and Donald Creighton, Canada's First Cen-
tury (Toronto, Macmillan, 1970). 
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1869 was clearly intended to be only temporary and thus tells us nothing 
about the intended status, bicultural or not, of the area. Further, the senti-
ments of politicians from George Brown to Joseph Howe and A.G. Archibald 
show that important Canadian political leaders expected the French to 
play a key role in opening the west. His most telling point is that when the 
Manitoba Act was debated in 1870 and the Northwest Territories Act in 1875 
and 1877 not a single objection was raised in parliament to the provisions 
for separate schools or the guarantees of the French language. It was not 
until D'Alton McCarthy raised his Equal Rights standard in the House of 
Commons in 1890 that anyone ever really questioned the "French fact" in 
western Canada.10 
Arthur Silver has challenged another traditional interpretation of the 
French role in western settlement with his strenuous objection to the idea 
that French Canadians ever believed in western expansion. The logical corol-
lary to this argument is that they did not lose the race for the west to the 
English because they were never in the competition. Theirs was simply not 
a pioneering society, Silver maintained, and they were incapable of meeting 
the great challenges that western expansion must necessarily have involved. 
Silver believed that French Canadians were always pessimistic about settle-
ment in the north west and tacitly assumed that western expansion would be 
the sole concern of Ontario. They believed that western land was basically 
unproductive, that they would lose their identity if they moved to Manitoba, 
and that they could never consider the prairies "part of their country." How-
ever, these reasons were not the only, nor even the primary, factors behind 
their failure to attempt to colonize the northwest. Silver asserted, as have 
others who have dealt with frontiers and expansion, that "one has to be born, 
or at least brought up, in the right kind of society to become a frontiersman . . . " 
French Canada in 1870, however, was not the right kind of society for pro-
ducing pioneers. It had not overcome serious obstacles or challenges. It had 
not experienced any major national mobilizations. It had not, in short, done 
great and dynamic things. It was, Silver asserted, a conquered society which 
had accepted its own conquest. It was a society "not of movement, but stasis, 
enforced by the very nature of the task of 'survival'."11 
Both Heintzman and Silver have cast a new light upon the French role 
in western settlement. It is clear from Heintzman's interpretation that the 
French would not have been in danger of losing their identity if they had 
moved west and had every opportunity to make Manitoba and the northwest 
as much their country as that of the English. Silver, on the other hand, is 
10 Ralph Heintzman, "The Spirit of Confederation: Professor Creighton, Biculturalism, and the 
Use of History," Canadian Historical Review, LH (September, 1971). 
11 Arthur L. Silver, "French Canada and the Prairie Frontier, 1870-1890," Canadian' Historical 
Review, L (March 1969). 
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telling us that the French themselves chose not to participate in the struggle 
to settle the west and thus completed a circle of self-fulfilling hypothesis. 
Their very absence allowed groups such as the Equal Rights Association to 
"cleanse" French from the west, and they were absent precisely because they 
were too docile a society to be confident of their ability to survive the pres-
sures that such groups might bring to bear. 
Another tradition in prairie historiography which has started to fall victim 
to re-interpretation centres around the founding and early activities of the 
North West Mounted Police and the treatment accorded the plains indians 
in the years prior to the Northwest Rebellion of 1885. The belief that the 
Police were founded and sent west to protect the indians from the ravages 
of the American-based whiskey trade and that their efforts were rewarded 
with the undying gratitude of chiefs such as Crowfoot of the Blackfeet is 
being seriously undermined. The story that is just starting to emerge will 
undoubtedly rob Canadians of one of their prize myths concerning the "hu-
mane" treatment accorded the indians north of the forty-ninth parallel as 
well as the friendly and understanding attitude of the Police towards those 
indians. It will, however, introduce a refreshing note of reality to the history 
of the momentous period of 1873 to 1885. The facts, according to S.W. 
Horrall, official historian of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, are that 
John A. Macdonald had no intention whatever to drive away American 
whiskey traders for the welfare and benefit of the indians when he contem-
plated the establishment of the Mounted Police. He simply feared a repeti-
tion in Canada of the continuous warfare of the American frontier and wished 
to create an efficient military force which would advance westward with the 
frontier of settlement to protect whites against indians. His concept of a force 
of mounted rifles was derived from his belief that such a group would be the 
most efficient under the unique conditions of western Canada. Since there 
was no appreciable settlement of whites in the west prior to 1873, and since 
the government was continuing to maintain a militia presence at Fort Garry, 
Macdonald continued to hesitate to carry out his plans. Despite the effects 
of the whiskey trade on the indians and complaints from the government 
of the United States that "Canadian" indians were raiding across the border 
into Montana to steal horses which were then taken to the whiskey peddlers 
for rifles and rotgut, Macdonald would take no action. 
If any one factor shook Macdonald from his lethargy, Horrall asserted, 
it was the massacre of a band of Assiniboine indians by a mixed group of 
English and French Canadian, as well as American, wolf-hunters, operating 
out of Fort Benton, Montana. The American Secretary of State, Hamilton 
Fish, as well as Alexander Morris, Lieutenant Governor of the Northwest 
Territories, feared that if some attempt were not made to bring the white 
killers to justice, a general indian war might break out in the area and they 
urged the Canadian government to action. Now Macdonald finally moved 
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and, prodded almost continually by Morris, went ahead with the organization 
of the Mounted Police Force and arranged their transfer to the northwest 
before the freeze-up on the Great Lakes in the fall of 1873. But he still had no 
intention of sending the force on a chase after whiskey peddlers. Macdonald 
had moved, but only because he was simply not willing to take chances with 
the possibility of an indian war. The man responsible for sending the police 
on their famous march to evict the unruly occupants of Fort Whoop Up, 
albeit reluctantly, was Macdonald's successor, Alexander Mackenzie. He was 
unsure of the potential effectiveness of the new force and at one point was 
ready to propose to the United States that it send its troops onto Canadian 
soil to suppress the whiskey trade. Eventually Morris' urgings and the com-
plaints of the Americans prevailed and in the spring of 1874 Antoine Doiron, 
the Liberal Minister of Justice, received authorization to unleash the Mounties 
against the whiskey traders.12 
The story of white-indian relations from this point is distressingly familiar 
to anyone who has read George Stanley's important work, The Birth of Wes-
tern Canada,13 and is one continuous tale of paternalism, official indifference 
and tragic suffering amongst the plains indians because of the ill-conceived 
policies of Ottawa officialdom. Canadians have sought some solace from this 
in the lack of any large-scale and sustained wars on their frontier as well as 
the apparently good relationship that prevailed between Mounted Police, 
missionaries and local government officials on the one hand and the indians 
on the other. They will not much longer be able to find comfort in any of 
these beliefs. Hugh Dempsey's biography Crowfoot, Chief of the Blackfeet 
is primarily the story of one of the greatest chiefs of the Blackfoot Confeder-
acy, a powerful group composed of the Blackfoot, Blood, Piegan, Gros 
Ventre and Sarcee tribes who roamed an area from the Upper Missouri 
river to the North Saskatchewan and from the Yellowstone River to the 
Rocky Mountains. It is also, however, a history of the decline and fall of an 
entire indian nation in Canada in the 1870's and 1880's. Dempsey's picture of 
what happened to the Blackfoot Confederacy, and it undoubtedly applies to 
other Canadian plains indians, is not one of misguided paternalism, official 
myopia or innocent miscalculation. It is an indictment of criminal negli-
gence, callousness and brutal inhumanity to be found not only in Ottawa, 
but on the spot, in the northwest, as well. Dempsey's farm instructors, mission-
aries, indian agents and, with too few exceptions, Mounted Police, cared 
little for the indian and less for his welfare. They were not particularly adept 
at what they did, could not sympathize with the plight of the indian, were 
greedy to the point of brutality and latched on to the Indian only for what 
12 S.W. Horrall, "Sir John A. Macdonald and the Mounted Police Force for the Northwest 
Territories," Canadian Historical Review, LIII (June, 1972). 
13 Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1960. 
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they could get from him whether it was his soul or the rations he was supposed 
to receive by right but which fetched higher prices elsewhere. The police 
often recognized the agents and instructors for what they were but were duty 
bound to protect the white man and his laws, even if it meant arresting indians 
who attempted to steal, from locked reservation storehouses, rations they 
needed to keep from starving. Everytime the police rode to protect a farm in-
structor or reservation agent who had been roughed up or shot at after trying to 
bilk sta rving indians out of their rations they lost more and more of the friendship 
and prestige so necessary for such a small force to maintain order. Dempsey's 
account plainly showed that only some of the police, particularly Cecil Denny 
and James MacLeod, really sympathized with the indians and genuinely tried 
to help them in their terrible hour of need. 
As to the lack of continuous indian war on the Canadian frontier, Dempsey 
clearly saw this as the result of nothing more than Crowfoot's realistic appraisal 
of the true strength of the whites. By the time of the outbreak of the Northwest 
Rebellion in 1885. Crowfoot was thoroughly disgusted with the treaty system but 
he had been taken on a tour of Regina and Winnipeg as part of Lieutenant Gov-
ernor Dewdney's strategy of impressing the power of white society upon the 
chiefs of treaty area number 7. On this trip Crowfoot saw, particularly in the 
thriving young city of Winnipeg, enough men and weapons to defeat the entire 
Blackfoot nation. In Dempsey's words he "returned to the reserve a wiser man." 
By 1885 the Blackfoot Confederacy was but a shell of its former powerful self, 
but Crowfoot was still one of the most influential chiefs on the plains. Had he 
joined forces with Poundmaker, Wandering Spirit and Riel there can be little 
question that a long and bloody war would have resulted. At the least this would 
have impeded the completion of the CPR and set western settlement back in-
definitely. At worst, it would have resulted in the intervention of the American 
army and the possible loss of the Northwest to Canada. None of these things 
happened but, according to Dempsey, it had nothing to do with Crowfoot's 
trust in whites.14 
In recent years scholars have paid increasing attention to trade unions, 
workers, labour political action, and industrial unrest in Canada and it has be-
come evident that western workers have played a prominent role in the history 
of the Canadian labour movement. Not only did they take to unionism from the 
beginning, they were also apparently more radical than workers in central 
Canada. In a recent paper Paul Phillips attempted to explain this phenomenon 
by pointing to the working environment of a post-frontier, resource extraction 
area. Though much of Phillips' study would apply specifically to British Colum-
bia his basic conclusion — that the National Policy created a separate and more 
radical labour movement in the west — applied to the prairies as well. The core 
14 Hugh A. Dempsey, Crowfoot, Chief of the Blackfeet (Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 
1972). 
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of Phillips' argument is basically quite simple. The National Policy moulded the 
distinctive resource-based economy of western Canada and the workers and 
unions developing in that environment tended to demonstrate distinctive, 
and radical characteristics. The National Policy tended to promote com-
mercial rather than industrial enterprise in the west and management tended 
to view labour relations as a short-run, rather than a long run consideration. 
They were unimpressed with the need to develop stable and peaceful relation-
ships with their workers. Phillips believed that the National Policy essentially 
created regions in Canada; one a protected manufacturing area in Ontario 
and Quebec, the other an unprotected resource extraction area in the west. 
The unprotected nature of western output meant greater instability in demands 
and prices for its products which, in turn, created greater insecurities of 
wages and employment. When combined with the isolation of the workers, 
their numerical weakness and the hazards of occupations such as mining and 
logging, this had a direct bearing on the growth of radicalism. The unions 
which developed in the west were thus a reflection both of the outlook of 
their membership and the attitudes of employers who wanted to place as 
much of the entrepreneurial risk as possible on the shoulders of their em-
ployees. Because the risk was considerable, the burden was great, and was one 
important cause of radicalism.15 
Phillips' interpretation should add a new dimension to the study of prairie 
labour history but some areas of specialization are so new that virtually 
everything published constitutes reinterpretation. One field is urbanization 
and it has been well served in the last few years by Alan Artibise, Max Foran 
and John Taylor who have each added immeasurably to our understanding 
of the dynamics of urban growth in the prairie west. Artibise has explored 
many facets of the development of Winnipeg to 1914 stressing the role of 
business and commercial interests, physical growth, urban planning (or the lack 
of it) and ethnic and class division in the city. He has described the iron-
grip of business interests on the development of Winnipeg and stressed the 
belief of the commercial classes that only their particular brand of knowledge 
and expertise could create a rational and profitable urban environment.16 
Foran has described Calgary in the period 1884 to 1895 and has discussed 
its growth, metropolitan impulses (evident even at this early stage), and social 
15 Paul Phillips, "The National Policy and the Development of the Western Canadian Labour 
Movement," in A.W. Rasporich and H.C. Klassen (eds.), Prairie Perspectives II (Toronto, Holt, 
Rhinehart and Winston, 1973). 
16 See, for example, Alan F.J. Artibise, "Winnipeg Civic Politics, 1874-1914: The Search for 
Business Efficiency in Municipal Affairs," paper presented to Seventh Annual Northern Great 
Plains History Conference, October 1972. Other articles are "An Urban Environment: The 
process of Growth in Winnipeg, 1874-1914," presented to the Canadian Historical Association 
meetings in 1972 and to appear in the CHA Historical Papers and "Winnipeg and the City Plan-
ning Movement, 1910-1915" in D. Bercuson (ed.), Western Perspectives I (Toronto, Holt Rhine-
hart and Winston, 1974). 
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character. Foran asserted that even though Calgary was tied to the ranching 
industry which played so important a part in the business, political and social 
life of the city, Calgary had commercial and agricultural aspirations, shared 
by the ranching community, from the very beginning. In addition, the re-
latively small population and the lack of any significant commercial class in 
these early years meant that the town council was forced to take upon itself 
tasks which might ordinarily have fallen to a Board of Trade.17 Taylor, con-
centrating on a later era, has revealed that urban political patterns developed 
quite differently in prairie cities such as Edmonton and Winnipeg. The 
latter city had been split along class lines by the Winnipeg Strike and its 
urban politics tended to follow socialist versus conservative lines. In Ed-
monton, however, class politics became almost irrelevant, geographic factors 
important, and a populist such as Joe Clarke could emerge to dominate the 
urban scene.18 A different but no less new, area of research is being covered 
by Ian Macpherson's studies of the cooperative movement. He has examined 
the Cooperative Union of Canada and its political involvements and has un-
covered the roots and workings of cooperation in the west beyond the tra-
ditional and oft-studied Wheat Pools.19 In these areas it is far too early to talk 
of the emergence of traditional patterns of interpretation but it is evident 
that the work being done is adding new depth to our understanding of prairie 
history. 
One paper which has signified the new mood of western historiography, 
perhaps better than any other, was recently delivered to the fifth Western 
Canadian Studies Conference at the University of Calgary. In it J.E. Rea 
offered challenge to traditional interpreters of western development who 
have utilized an almost exclusive agrarian approach to prairie development. 
Historians such as W.L. Morton, Rea asserted, belong to the landscape and 
glory in the rural experience — the warm sun, rich soil and blue skies of 
the prairies. Their attitude towards the cities of the west is scornful because 
all cities to them are very much alike and urban dwellers "know neither the 
revolution of the seasons nor the relevance of time and place . . ." Not only 
are their roots agrarian, Rea pointed out, but Anglo-Saxon as well and thus 
they extol rural, British, values to the virtual exclusion of all others. There is, 
however, another west, Rea asserted, and it is the west of the immigrants, 
the cities and slums, the industrialists and unions and the too often corrupt 
17 Max I. Foran, "Urban Calgary 1884-1895," Histoire Sociale Vol. V. (April, 1972). 
18 John H. Taylor, "Urban Social Organization and Urban Discontent: The 1930's", in D. Ber-
cuson (ed.), Western Perspectives I (Toronto, Holt, Rhinehart and Winston, 1974). 
19 See, for example, Ian Macpherson, 'The Cooperative Union of Canada and the Prairies, 
1919-1929," in S. Trofimenkoff (ed.), The Twenties in Western Canada (Ottawa, National Mu-
seum of Man, 1972) and "The Cooperative Union of Canada and Politics, 1909-31," Canadian 
Historical Review LIV (June 1973). 
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politicians. And a new breed of "pavement bred" historians is beginning to 
record this history as well. Theirs is as much the story of the west as are the 
writings of Morton and others of his stripe, but is more concerned with soci-
ety and economics, social movements, ethnic groupings and regional charac-
teristics. Here Rea discussed scholars such as John Thompson, who has under-
taken a study on the immigrant/prohibition question, William Calderwood, 
who has explored the fascinating appeal of the Ku Klux Klan to the "xeno-
phobia" of the Anglo-Saxon population of Saskatchewan, and Richard Allen, 
who has done so much to uncover the roots, accomplishments and legacies 
of the social gospel movement in the Canadian west. Rea concluded this 
fascinating look at prairie history with the hope that this new research may 
bring about the recognition that "the west, as a complex social matrix, was 
much more than an agricultural domain."20 
There is, thus, much that is new and exciting developing in prairie his-
toriography. The old one dimensional, dry and dusty, images are fast disap-
pearing. Reinterpretation, controversy and vigorous debate are the founda-
tions upon which a mature historiography is being built. If the scholarship 
of the last few years offers true portent of things to come, then the study 
of the prairie west is about to embark on its most fascinating and enlightening 
adventure to date. 
DAVID J. BERCUSON 
"THE COMPANY PROVINCE" and ITS CENTENNIALS 
A REVIEW OF RECENT 
BRITISH COLUMBIA HISTORIOGRAPHY 
Upon crossing the mountains to British Columbia, a visitor is soon struck 
by the extent of public recognition given the province's relatively brief his-
tory: a myriad of historical markers alongside the highways; new historical 
museums in small towns and large; reconstructions of old towns at Barkerville 
and Fort Steele; and a variety of historical pamphlets on the newsstands. 
History in British Columbia, however, is more than an adjunct to the tourist 
industry. Much of the physical evidence of historical interest is the legacy of 
provincial centennials in 1958, 1966 and 1971 and the Canadian centennial 
of 1967. These, and long-standing general interest have inspired the publica-
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